conditioning-ever yone who needs and wants informa tion from space wonders how we ever got along without it. All joint docu ments un der score this fact, in clud ing Joint Vi sion 2010 and Trans form ing Defense: National Se cu rity in the 21st Century, the latter report em pha siz ing the impor tance of space and stat ing that "unre stricted use of space has become a strate gic inter est of the United States." 1 Al though other services have been involved in space and certainly employ data from space in all opera tions, the Air Force is the space service for the Depart ment of De fense (DOD), provid ing the overwhelm ing ma jor ity of both the military space budget and the people engaged in space acqui si tion and op era tions. Over the last 15 years, the im por tance of space within the Air Force has increased substan tially. However, the airplane cul ture has been clearly dominant. Today, for a vari ety of reasons-De sert Storm, loss of over seas information-gathering assets, the grow ing military depend ency on space, tech nol ogy that per mits the plac ing of more ca pa bili ties in space, and the steadily dimin ish ing DOD budget-the Air Force has totally and une quivo cally embraced the space mission and has made a commit ment to its steward-8 AIR POWER JOURNAL SPRING 1999 ship. Nowhere is this commit ment better enun ci ated than in the strategic-vision docu ment Global Engage ment: A Vision for the 21st Cen tury Air Force: "We are now transi tion ing from an air force into anair and space force on an evolu tion ary path to a space and air force" (em pha sis in original). 2 This document also en vi sions the in te gra tion of air and space, op era tion ally and insti tu tion ally. It is inter est ing to note that Air Force thinking on this vi sion has evolved in recent months to the point that senior offi cials now talk about a seam less aero space rather than a space and air force.
Mak ing this vision a real ity will be one of the Air Force's biggest challenges in the next cen tury. Besides melding the air and space cul tures, which will take years to achieve, the serv ice also faces the chal lenge of evolv ing the nec es sary tech nol ogy in the face of con tin ued budget pressure. Military space programs have fared well in this decade-the topline budget has gen er ally re mained con stant while most of the other major mission areas have de clined. The military space budget today is around $7 billion, 85 percent of which is in the Air Force. 3 This budget sustains and modern izes the commu ni ca tions, naviga tion, warn ing, weather, space command and con trol, and launch capa bili ties on which we all de pend. In the absence of a major change in the threat or the geopo liti cal equation, the next century likely will continue to see sig nifi cant pres sure on the de fense budget. To re al ize the evolu tion ary vision of the Air Force, how ever, will proba bly en tail per form ing new mis sions from space. Given the contin ued budget constraints, the Air Force will have an in creas ingly diffi cult time funding the sus tain ment of current military-space force struc ture while at the same time pur su ing new op por tu ni ties criti cal to re al iz ing our vi sion.
This arti cle suggests a greater reli ance on com mer cial space as an approach to this di lemma. On the one hand, commer ciali za tion is not a total panacea. To be sure, some functions are not ame na ble to com mer ciali za tion, such as mis sile warning, signals intel li gence, certain sur veil lance functions inte grated into weapon sys tems, heroi cally surviv able assured com mu ni ca tions, and space weapons. On the other hand, the commer cial space indus try is ex pand ing at such a rate and with such mar vel ous ca pa bili ties that it seems rea son able if not in evi ta ble that a number of missions-here tofore the exclu sive province of the govern ment-can be satis fied or aug mented com mer cially. We can also real ize signifi cant ef fi cien cies by taking advan tage of commer cial space.
Evolution of the National Space Sectors
The Sovi ets' launch of Sput nik I created a cri sis of US national identity that galva nized both govern ment and indus try. One of Presi dent Dwight Eisen how er's initia tives to deal with this crisis was the National Aeronau tics and Space Act of l958, which created the Na tional Aeronau tics and Space Admin istra tion (NASA) and estab lished the policy that devoted the civil space program to "peaceful pur poses for the benefit of all mankind." At the same time, the act clearly stated that "ac tivi ties pecu liar to or primar ily asso ci ated with the devel op ment of weapon systems, mili tary opera tions, or the defense of the United States (includ ing the research and de vel op ment neces sary to make effec tive provi sion for the de fense of the United States) shall be the re spon si bil ity of the De part ment of De fense." 4 In other words, the act explic itly es tab lished-in law and in pol icy-a sepa rate and in de pend ent military space program.
At about this same time, the Eis en hower admini stra tion had grave con cerns that the So vi ets enjoyed a large lead over the United States in the devel op ment of long-range mis siles-the begin ning of the so-called missile gap. To ob tain hard in tel li gence on So viet mis sile devel op ment, a joint Central Intel li gence Agency (CIA)-Air Force team devel oped the U-2 air craft, which be gan fly ing over the USSR in June l956. Because of the vulner abil ity of these aircraft, the CIA and Air Force began the de vel op ment of recon nais sance satel lites, com bin ing these separate efforts with the crea tion of the National Recon nais sance Of fice (NRO) in Sep tem ber 1961. 5 This cov ert of fice-whose exis tence remained unknown un til 1992-con ducted its op era tions in the ut most secrecy.
Thus, three space sectors-civil, military, and intel li gence-have existed since 1961. Al though the sectors inter acted in areas such as selected technol ogy transfer, launch, and satel lite command and control, they remained in de pend ent for 30 years, for the most part due to distinct differ ences in their missions.
The fourth sec tor-com mer cial-also be gan in the early 1960s with the launch of the first com mu ni ca tions satel lite. From the outset, space commu ni ca tions proved an attrac tive ven ture and, over time, grew not only in the United States but also in Canada, Great Brit ain, France, and several inter na tional consor tia, all of whom built commer cial com mu ni ca tions satel lites. Although the other sectors had their origins in law and presiden tial policy, not until the Reagan admini stra tion did we identify commer cial space as a sepa rate sector with compre hen sive policy under pin nings. 6 Growth of the communications-satellite market; indus try ex pan sion; and emerging commer cial mar kets for launch, naviga tion, and remote sens ing led to this formal recog ni tion. Moreover, this emerging indus try also faced foreign com pe ti tion-either from inter na tional con sor tia or from strong aerospace countries such as France. Because the Reagan admini stra tion was clearly probusi ness, it believed that commer cial space needed a solid publicpolicy founda tion.
This bit of space history provides a histori cal context for the compo nents of our na tional space program. In sum, we estab lished our four space sectors as inde pend ent enti ties. Each president since Eisen hower enunci ated his admin istra tion's space policy, which reaf firmed the separate ness of the sec tors. In the last 15 years, the sectors gradually have be come more in ter de pend ent. To day, for ex am ple, NASA, the NRO, and the Air Force are enter ing into coop era tive partner shipsinclud ing joint archi tec tures, technol ogy sharing, and joint programs-at an unprece dented rate. All sectors will continue to conThree space sectors-civil, military, and intelligence-have existed since 1961. . . . They remained indepen dent for 30 years, for the most part due to distinct differences in their missions.
verge and overlap-an inter de pend ence that is not only inexo ra ble but also good govern ment.
To use a solar-system analogy, one may describe space sectors as plan ets in their own orbits, which, over time, have begun to con verge. In the twenty-first century, the planet/sec tor with the highest density-and thus gravita tional pull-may well be the com mer cial sphere. In other words, although we will always have a compel ling need for strong mili tary, intel li gence, and civil space sectors, some tra di tional mis sions will likely break off and be absorbed by the commer cial sector.
The Explosion of Commercial Space
For nearly 40 years, the govern ment has domi nated the space business. Low-risk, costplus contracts with NASA, the military, or the in tel li gence commu nity were the norm. Today, that picture is changing, and the rate of change will become even more dramatic. A number of factors have contrib uted to this phe nome non: the rapid evo lu tion of in for ma tion technolo gies, such as the explo sive growth in semicon duc tor technol ogy and the ex traor di nary advances in digital signal pro cessing and voice com pres sion; prog ress in in ter na tional space policy, includ ing the in creas ing de regu la tion of tele com mu ni ca tions serv ices, the allo ca tion of new spectrums to com mer cial satel lite commu ni ca tions, and the allow ance of higher imagery resolu tion for commer cial remote sensing; funda men tal changes in the process and cost of satel lite manu fac tur ing; the increased reli abil ity (if not decreas ing costs) of launches; and an ex pand ing global demand for satel lite services driven by the infor ma tion revolu tion.
Con se quently, a remark able infu sion of pri vate capi tal into space and space-related in dus try has occurred. Accord ing to esti mates by Space Pub li ca tions and the con sult ing firm A. T. Kearney, worldwide revenues from space are currently $88 billion annu ally, projected to grow to $117 billion by 2001. 7 Although this growth may not be surpris ing, the fact that the govern ment is not the en gine may indeed be surpris ing. The commer cial space mar ket is the driver-its growth is 20 percent an nu ally com pared to about 2 per cent for the gov ern ment. Inci den tally, in 1996 the total reve nues of the commer cial sector surpassed the gov ern ment's for the first time (53 per cent and 47 percent, respec tively). 8 By 2001 com mer cial revenues may account for 70 percent of space-industry revenues.
Fur ther more, if one exam ines and aggre gates all the various satel lite ventures planned over the next 10 years, the number of satel lites projected for launch into orbit to tals over seven teen hundred. 9 Although all such ventures may not prove success ful, the launch of more than one thousand satel lites would probably be a conser va tive esti mate. This de mand i s f u e l i n g a com men su rate launch require ment that as late as four years ago was consid ered wildly specu la tive and highly improb able. I can make that state ment with some cer tainty because five years ago I was deeply engrossed in chairing a national space-launch study. We thought we were pretty bullish, but our pre dicted launch mani fests were well off the mark. One finds a certain wisdom in Yogi Ber ra's maxim that it is tough to make pre dic tions, particu larly about the future. Al though several entre pre neurs had plans to launch tens of small commu ni ca tions satel lites to low Earth orbit (LEO), funding was prob lem ati cal, and no one at that time an tici pated the extent of this market. Today, these pro lif er ated sys tems have be come a re al ity and are now being launched. These new mul ti sat el lite com mu ni ca tions con stel la tions will clearly dominate future launch mani fests.
Communications
As it was in the past, space-based com mu ni ca tions is the gi ant in space com merce. The gi ant clearly will be even more dominant in the fu ture, and the in for ma tion revo lu tion will be the driver. Globally, govern ments, business, and indi vidu als want to receive more data faster, which will drive the demand for bandwidth. Satel lites offer an effi cient and rela-tively inex pen sive means to move large amounts of data quickly.
Quite a bit of excite ment and atten dant pub lic ity has charac ter ized these new satellite-communications ventures. Part of the excite ment derives from the players and sub stan tial invest ment involved. Busi ness Week noted that "some of the most dynamic en tre pre neurs of recent times are hooked on the great space race and orbit ing egos will en hance a drama already fueled by mind bog gling sums." 10 The names of the players make any one sit up and take notice: Bill Gates, Ru pert Murdock, Craig McCaw, and Bernard Schwartz. The projected invest ment in a host of communications-satellite pro grams, which ac count for the bulk of the one-thousand-plus sat el lites projected for launch, totals about $40 billion.
Al though the new distrib uted systems designed to oper ate at LEO and medium Earth or bit (MEO) have received most of the atten tion, tradi tional geosyn chro nous satel lites will continue to play a major role commerci ally and in support of national secu rity objec tives. The Commer cial Space Transpor ta tion Advi sory Commit tee of the Depart ment of Transpor ta tion predicts an aver age of 33 launches annu ally to geosyn chro nous orbit over the next decade. 11 Although many peo ple in the space commu nity are convert ing to the "smaller is better" man tra, sat el lites for this orbit will continue to become heavier and more capa ble. Factors influ enc ing the de mand for heavier satel lites include the avail abil ity, in the not too distant future, of new heavy-lift launch vehi cles, the increased costeffectiveness of larger spacecraft (on a dollars-per-transponder basis), a trend to larger anten nae, increas ing power require ments to accommodate the expanded capa bil ity, and orbital conges tion. In other words, be cause the geo syn chro nous belt is be com ing crowded, the slots are becom ing dearer; conse quently, space business men want to field the most capa ble satel lite. That means heavier satel lites with as many transpond ers as possi ble. The desir abil ity of maxi miz ing transpond ers per satel lite is an in exo ra ble trend. Twenty years ago the av er age com mu ni ca tions satel lite had 10 transpond ers; today the figure is 30.
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Sev eral new geosyn chro nous pro grams un der devel op ment, such as Cyber star, Spaceway, As tro link, and Euro sky Way, are de signed to provide global, two-way, broadband capa bil ity to meet the needs for voice, data, inter ac tive mul ti me dia, and video tele con fer enc ing. These new programs will also address the need to service the demands of the Inter net-a mar ket that may well sur pass phone serv ices or broad cast ing. The com puter in dus try must find faster and more effi cient ways of mov ing huge amounts of digi tal in forma tion and video. Inci den tally, our national se cu rity estab lish ment obvi ously has the same require ment. Fiber will be impor tant, but I be lieve that sat el lites will serv ice that de mand be fore fi ber be comes domi nant. Geo syn chro nous satellites likely will always have a ma jor role, given their unique advan tages in si mul ta ne ous access to large regions and their tre men dous capac ity.
At a lower al ti tude re gime (MEO and LEO), a number of excit ing and techni cally chal leng ing programs on the hori zon will also serv ice the worldwide, two-way, broadband mul ti me dia need. These programs feature very large constel la tions and have recently re ceived a great deal of noto ri ety due to the amount of invest ment involved. In this cate gory the most auda cious is proba bly Tele desic, the so-called Internet in the sky, which envi sions 288 sat el lites in or bits from 100 to 1,400 km. This cate gory also in cludes the Wide band Euro Sat Telecom (10 satel lites), Sky bridge (64 sat el lites), and Orblink (seven satel lites).
In another class of low-orbiting commu ni ca tions satel lites, the new product is inex pen sive, worldwide personal-communications serv ice. The compe ti tion here is fierce, and the stakes are high. One may group these programs by the size of the constel la tion (Big and Lit tle) and by own er ship (US-only and pri mar ily foreign). US-owned Big LEOs include Irid ium, Globalstar, Ecco, and Ellipso, while mostly foreign-owned Big LEOs include ICO Global (a 79-nation consor tium), Signal (a Rus sian firm), Euro-African Sat Telecom (Matra-Marconi), and Eco 8 (Telebras-Brazil). US-owned Little LEOs, which provide global, hand held, one-way-store and forwardcommunications sys tems, in clude Orb comm, Gemnet, FaiSat, and Starsys. Foreign-owned Lit tle LEO programs include Elekon (Rus sia/Ger many), Gonets-D (Russia), Iris (Bel gium), and Leo One (Mexico). 13 These sys tems, of course, will have tre men dous business advan tages by linking inter na tional corpo rate offices. In the long run, how ever, the big gest bene fi ci ar ies are likely to be the two billion or so people who live in ar eas not serviced by phone lines. The risks in this business are very high. Many of the tech nolo gies needed for global telephone services are un proven, and over com ing the regu la tory ob sta cles to gain access to foreign markets is by no means certain. Although Iridium has suc cess fully deployed a full constel la tion of space craft, other systems have encoun tered prob lems. In Sep tem ber 1998, for ex am ple, 12 Global star satel lites were lost when their Ukrain ian Ze nit booster failed to reach or bit.
What are the impli ca tions of this bur geoning commer cial communicationssatellite indus try for the other space sectors? Op era tion ally, military satel lite commu ni ca tions will benefit in terms of access to addi tional capac ity (tremen dous increases in avail able bandwidth and flexibil ity, as well as mul ti plic ity of alter na tive commu ni ca tion paths). Today in Bosnia the mili tary is leas ing a commer cial high-bandwidth, directbroadcast system to service the needs of US ground forces in Bosnia and their support ing in fra struc ture in Europe and back in the United States. Currently this system provides re con nais sance data, weather, intel li gence on de mand, and even Cable News Network to about 30 differ ent loca tions at 24 megabits a sec ond. In addi tion to the increases in capac ity, commer cial commu ni ca tions satel lites-be cause of their relat i v e l y short-acquisition time lines-can serve as "gap fillers" to provide conti nu ity of highbandwidth serv ice in the event of the deg ra da tion or loss of govern ment capa bil ity.
These new commer cial systems also offer ef fi cien cies that po ten tially have more sig nifi cance than the opera tional advan tages. The short cycle-times of commer cial satel lites are re mark able compared to the governmentacquisition cy cles. For ex am ple, new com mer cial geosyn chro nous satel lites are available 18 months after order-soon to be down to 12 months. For the small LEO sys tems, time from or der to deliv ery is about three years-proba bly less as these systems mature. In contrast, the acqui si tion of national secu rity systems runs 10 to 15 years. To under stand the profound contrast in time lines, one should con sider that the same plant will build three hun dred Teledesic satel lites in three years and 15 Global Posi tion ing System (GPS) satel lites in seven years.
Be cause time is money, satel lites will be con sid era bly cheaper. Moreover, these short time lines afford the oppor tu nity to take advan tage of new technolo gies because the launch rate is so much faster. How about satel lite design? I antici pate a greater use of com mer cial com mon buses with tai lored na tional se cu rity pay loads. This ap proach would bene fit not only from shorter acqui si tion cycles but also from economies of scale since the com mer cial vendor produces satel lites in num bers far exceed ing national secu rity require ments. Finally, taking advan tage of com mer cial produc tion can mean a stable and flexi ble source of capi tal. To day, Wall Street is wait ing to see how its invest ments in Iridium, Global star, and Orbcomm will pan out. If these ventures meet inves tors' expec ta tions, this promises to be a capital-rich business with a constancy and conti nu ity of purpose based upon con tinu ing de mand. I am not sure that we can antici pate the same stabil ity in gov ern ment funding.
Launch
The space-launch business is changing as dra mati cally as space commu ni ca tions. From 1975 to 1995, the national launch rate was about 23 launches a year, with govern ment sec tors con sti tut ing about 75 to 80 per cent of all launches. Over the next 10 years, the number of launches will increase to 45-52 a year, and commer cial launches will exceed both civil (NASA) and those catego rized as na tional secu rity (military and intel li gence).
14 Space launch is also under go ing major mod erni za tion. The govern ment's current space-launch systems derive from early intercon ti nen tal ballis tic missiles (ICBM). Deltas, At lases, and Ti tans were ef fec tive launch ve hi cles in the first 15 years of the space age, but as the launch rate declined, the cost of access to space grew consid era bly. This was espe cially true of the heavy-lift capa bil ity-the Titan's cost had grown to $250-300 million per launch by the early 1990s. Many people were also con cerned that the time to launch was ex ces sive, es pe cially for the Ti tan-from ei ther a military-operational or commercialcompetitiveness standpoint. By the early 1990s, due in large part to these high costs and sched ul ing diffi cul ties, the French Ariane ve hi cles had captured 60 percent of the com mer cial market.
Con se quently, the 1980s saw a number of pro grams proposed to make the fleet of ex pend able launch ve hi cles (ELV) more ef fi cient and effec tive. Unfor tu nately, the military, in tel li gence, and civil space sectors couldn't agree on a single national program. After about 10 years of debate, an agreement codi fied as the National Space Transpor ta tion Policy emerged in August of 1994. This policy as signed DOD the respon si bil ity for funding and oper at ing the US fleet of ELVs, and NASA be came the lead agency for the tech nol ogy de vel op ment and demon stra tion of the next gen era tion of reus able launch vehi cles (RLV).
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To day, the Air Force has the evolved ex pend able launch vehi cle (EELV), a $2 billion pro gram that recently entered the engi neer ing and manufac tur ing devel op ment phase. This program seeks to lever age private invest ment to increase the capa bil ity of two indus try teams over the next two dec ades. The goals are to increase opera tional respon sive ness and to reduce the launch life-cycle cost by 25 per cent. I have no doubt that the pro gram will meet these goals and probably surpass them. Ob vi ously, this lower cost would give the United States a cost advan tage and a likely increase in inter na tional market share. The first flight for the medium commer cial EELV is 2001, and the first govern ment opera tional pay loads are slated for launch in fiscal year 2002. The Air Force has acquired commer cial launch ser-vices for a total of 28 govern ment pay loads scheduled through 2006. 16 As for NASA, it is sponsor ing RLV tech nolo gies such as the X-33 (a one-half-scale single-stage-to-orbit tech nol ogy dem on stra tor) and the X-34 small-booster technol ogy dem on stra tor. Clearly, the military believes that, ulti mately, the most effec tive and effi cient way of achieving low-cost, highly op era tional access to space lies in the RLV or a space plane. Because of profound techni cal chal lenges in propul sion, mate ri als, and struc tures, the military is an active partici-pant in NASA's RLV technol ogy work. If the RLV demon stra tions prove success ful, the fin ished model might be designed to replace the shut tle. Some people believe that financ ing and oper at ing the new RLV would be a com mer cial venture.
But the govern ment's launchmodernization efforts tell only part of the story. Although the govern ment used to have a vir tual mo nop oly on the sys tems and sites to ac cess space, that picture has funda men tally changed. Ariane arose as a competi tor in the last decade, and now we have the Pegasus aircraft-launched system, several new com mer cial ELVs, and a sea-launch option from an oil-rig type of platform south of Hawaii, pro jected for opera tion in 1999. Addi tion ally, US firms have entered into agreements with in ter na tional partners. Russian vehi cles such as the Proton, Zenit, Tsyklon, and Kosmos are now avail able, and the Chi nese Long March is also an in ex pen sive, al beit risky, op tion. Ad di tion ally, we are see ing the emer gence of fed erally endorsed, state-sponsored spaceports. Cur rently, Florida, Califor nia, and Virginia have estab lished programs offer ing launch serv ices from ex ist ing pads at Cape Ca nav eral Air Force Station, Vanden berg Air Force Base, and Wallops Island, respec tively. Other states such as Hawaii and Alaska have strong support for indige nous launch capa bili ties.
An other very inter est ing devel op ment is the contract ing out of launch services. NASA, which has led the way in this area, hired the United Space Al li ance, a pri vate joint ven ture, in 1996 to take over shuttle opera tions at the Ken nedy Space Center. This transi tion to pri vate manage ment, to be complete in 2002, is de signed to get NASA out of the business of run ning the expen sive and manpowerintensive shut tle op era tion so that it can plow back the savings into its core mission of space sci ences and technol ogy. 17 In sum, space launch is under go ing dra matic change. Highly competi tive today, the busi ness will become even more so in the fu ture. Commer cial satel lite builders-un der standa bly concerned with cost and re spon sive ness/time li ness-now have a range of options, includ ing the use of multi ple launch sites and multi ple vehi cles for a single sat el lite constel la tion. For exam ple, Iridium is be ing deployed by at least three differ ent launch vehi cles (Delta, Proton, and Long March) from three differ ent loca tions (Vanden berg, Baikonur [Russia], and Taiyuan Space Launch Center [China]).
Given these ba sic changes, what are the im pli ca tions for the Air Force and the na tional se cu rity commu nity? First, I think the com pe ti tion is such that launch costs for the gov ern ment will drop signifi cantly. I also be lieve that the contin ued commer ciali za tion of launch is inexo ra ble. Conse quently, I think that the Air Force will follow NASA's lead and ul ti mately purchase launch as a commod ity. In the not-too-distant future, I envi sion com mer cial firms oper at ing the launch sites at Van den berg and Cape Canav eral. The Air Force and other satel lite builders would contract for a satel lite capa bil ity on orbit. (The Navy has used this effec tively with the ultrahigh-frequency follow-on program.) This outsourcing would prove more costeffective since it would al low ei ther re duc tion or transfer of expen sive Air Force people to other endeav ors.
Remote Sensing
Com mer cial remote sensing from space is an other in dus try poised to take off dur ing the next decade. Like space launch, this area re mained the sole do main of the gov ern ment for many years. Space recon nais sance systems built and oper ated by the NRO have provided in tel li gence on poten tial adver sar ies that has proven essen tial to our military and vital to suc cess ful arms control agreements. On the civil side, since 1972 this country has flown Land sat, a civil remote-sensing satel lite ini tially built and oper ated by NASA and then trans ferred to the National Oceanographic and Atmos pheric Admin istra tion. In 1985 the gov ern ment privat ized the program and placed respon si bil ity for it in the hands of the Earth Ob ser va tion Sat el lite (EO SAT) Com pany un der the premise that within a reason able amount of time, revenues from product sales and ground-station fees would exceed costs. For a vari ety of reasons-gov ern ment restric tions on the quality of data, distri bu tion prob lems, and lack of fund ing as sur ance-this com mer ciali za tion expe ri ence failed.
The is sue of gov ern ment pol icy con cern ing re mote sens ing was one of the hot test space issues of the early 1990s. Hav ing par tici pated in the debates, I believe that several reasons ex isted for redress ing remote-sensing policy at that time. The first involved a growing accep tance of the value of Landsat and the French SPOT system for military appli ca tions, both of which had proved their worth in Desert Storm. The sec ond en tailed a strong be lief that the United States needed gov ern ment sup port for contin ued invest ment in remote sensing to monitor envi ron mental change. Last, and most impor tant, SPOT provided consid era bly bet ter resolu tion than Landsat. For that rea son there existed legiti mate concerns that, with out a pol icy change which re moved reso lu tion restric tions, the United States would lose out in the market place for multispec tral sat el lite imagery, espe cially since the French con tin ued to invest in a higher-resolution SPOT system as well as the Helios military recon nais sance system. Other countries staked claims to the mar ket as well, includ ing India, Ja pan, and the European Union consor tium. Two camps emerged, one con sist ing of in dus try, envi ron men tal ists, and elements of the sci en tific commu nity who believed that our re stric tive policies were unre al is tic and wanted a policy to stimulate the remotesensing business. The other included ele ments of the military and intel li gence com mu ni ties concerned about unre stricted trade in remote sens ing. This group ad vo cated con trols over distri bu tion.
The debate resulted in a reason able com pro mise-the Land Remote Sensing Act of 1992, which formed the foun da tion for com mer cial opera tion of remote-sensing sys tems. The act per mits com pa nies to ap ply to the De part ment of Com merce for li censes to build and oper ate these systems. Recog niz ing the secu rity con cerns of to tally un fet tered op era tion and dis tri bu tion of data, the act and sub se quent policy direc tives require compa nies to maintain tasking records so that the gov ern ment can deter mine who is asking for what data when. Compa nies must also main tain control of the spacecraft at all times and be able to limit collec tion or distri bu tion upon di rec tion of the US gov ern ment. The act also authorizes the govern ment to cut off or re strict data during times of crisis or conflict.
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This act also spoke to the sale of re mote satel lite systems; specifi cally, the Clinton admini stra tion noted that "such sensi tive tech nol ogy shall be made avail able . . . only on the basis of a govern ment to govern ment agree ment." Fur ther, the act codi fied the manage ment agreement whereby DOD would build the follow-on Landsat space craft and in stru ments, while NASA would fund and oper ate the ground station, process ing, and dis tri bu tion systems. 19 With the proper policy founda tion estab lished, the govern ment has granted a total of 12 licenses to date, includ ing five highresolution electro-optical systems and one high-resolution radar system. Three US ven tures appear at this time to be seri ous com peti tors in the remote-sensing business. One should note that the volatile, competi tive na ture of this business will probably produce a shake out over the next few years.
If first-to-orbit is the measure, then the leader is EarthWatch, Inc. On 24 Decem ber 1997, it or bited Early Bird 1,a sat el lite de signed to pro vide three-meter reso lu tion two to three days from the time of request. As further evi dence of the inter na tion ali za tion of space com merce, Early Bird 1 was launched on a con verted Rus sian ICBM from the Svo bodny Cos mo drome, Russia's newest commer cial launch site. Unfor tu nately, the satel lite failed soon after launch. EarthWatch is now focus ing on Quickbird, a one-meter resolu tion sys tem to be launched from Russia on a Kosmos booster.
An other competi tor in the game, Space Im ag ing EOSAT, will initially offer a one-meter prod uct-the highest resolu tion of any com mer cially available system-that will have im agery available within one day of order. The
Worldwide commerce in high-resolution imagery has significant positive and some negative implications.
first Space Imag ing satel lite was scheduled to launch in late 1998 from Van den berg Air Force Base atop an Athena-2 booster but has been post poned until the Spring of 1999. Or bit ing Image (ORBIMAGE), the third major player, offers the OrbView series of satel lites: Orb View 1, a small lightning-andatmospheric mapper launched in 1995; OrbView 2, an ocean-color-and-vegetation mapping satel lite launched suc cess fully in August 1997 after a four-year delay; and Orb View 3, the compa ny's first venture into the realm of higher resolu tion, which, after launch in 1999, will provide one-meter resolu tion (black and white) and multispec tral (color) pic tures at four meters. A follow-on satel lite, Orb View 4 , will also in clude an Air Force-spon sored hy per spec tral im ag ing ca pa bil ity (Warfighter 1), adver tised as able to de tect objects through camou flage and tree cano pies. In ter est ingly enough, OR BIMAGE is the first commer cial venture to secure a prelaunch contract with the US govern ment. Planned for launch aboard a Pegasus rocket, Orb View 4's promised features may exceed Pega sus's ca pa bil ity and thus re quire a Tau rus rocket.
20
Other remote-sensing systems planned for launch in the next few years deserve men tion. These include AVSAT, which will provide a more macro view at one-kilometer resolu tion for geophysi cal exploi ta tion; Boeing's Resource 21, aimed at the agri cul tural market; and RDL's Radar 1, which will provide allweather, medium-resolution radar imagery to com mer cial buyers. Inter na tional systems, some fly ing to day and oth ers sched uled for orbit in two to three years, include SPOT (France), RADAR SAT (Canada), IRS (India), ALOS (Japan), CBERS (China/Brazil), and EROS (Israel). I believe that these programs will remain viable, primar ily because of the mar ket but also because they repre sent a na tional resource for their countries.
Clearly, great opti mism exists for this par ticu lar niche of the commer cial space busi ness. Is it justi fied? Market Plan Graphics, a market-research firm hired by the De part ment of Commerce, esti mates that this will be a $2.65-billion-a-year business by the turn of the century. 21 Others say that this figure is con ser va tive and that antici pated revenue by 2000 is closer to $5 billion. I don't know what is right, but I do know that the Landsat exam ple-in volv ing the govern ment as the primary cus tomer for a rela tively low-resolution prod uct-is not the model. Today, all firms offer high resolu tion, and the number of systems pro jected for orbit will ensure that the prod uct remains timely. In terms of demand, the uses for remote-sensing data abound-envi ron mental monitor ing, energy (oil and gas) ex plo ra tion, resource manage ment (agri cul tural and mineral), mapmak ing, and commu nity and urban planning, to name just a few. To day, aircraft systems provide synop tic im agery for these and other appli ca tions, but high-resolution satel lites are far more effi cient.
The market is in its infancy but has huge po ten tial. Remote sensing will become an es sen tial part of the in for ma tion revo lu tion. Im ages on demand, in clud ing threedimensional products linked to the databases of other geographic infor ma tion sys tems and mensu rated and indexed through GPS, will become the order of the day. The only question is not whether this will happen but when. I am inclined to believe that the pacing factor will be distri bu tion sys tems, with their effi ciency driven by com mu ni ca tions bandwidth and comput ing power. Al though I cer tainly can't pre dict the rate of growth, I am inclined to see the util-ity of remote sensing in the context of the movie Field of Dreams-build the systems, and they will come. How ever, some ques tion may remain as to when the remote-sensing in dus try will become profit able.
World wide commerce in high-resolution im agery has signifi cant positive and some nega tive impli ca tions. On the negative side, how does the military deal with adver sar ies who can access up-to-date imagery benchmarked against GPS on their personal com put ers through the Internet? Not only will en sur ing the element of surprise in military op era tions be infi nitely more diffi cult, the im agery becomes the target ing data base for the rogue nation or terror ist. This is why the Clin ton admini stra tion has in sisted on "shut ter control." I don't have a good answer for this di lemma, but the mili tary of the next cen tury must plan its op era tions with this po ten tial transpar ency in mind, and it must de velop sophis ti cated counter mea sures. On the positive side, this readily available im agery has immense benefits to our military. One of the intel li gence shortcom ings of De sert Storm was that the task ing cy cle-the time from making the initial request to receiv ing the imagery product-was too lengthy. Com mer cial remote-sensing data inte grated into a re spon sive distri bu tion system will meet many needs of the war fighter.
Even to day, we see a mi cro cosm of how this might evolve. In a growing number of loca tions, the Air Force has de ployed small, porta ble ground sta tions to re ceive SPOT im agery at tac ti cal field units. That is an Air Force exam ple. A number of other service ex am ples ex ist, such as traffi ca bil ity analysis for ground forces and oceano graphic and coastal analy sis for naval forces. Another very impor tant de fense appli ca tion in volves pro vid ing the ba sic source for mapmak ing. Gener ally, we have up-to-date maps of the major countries of Europe and Asia. However, our forces are in creas ingly be ing de ployed to un der de vel oped ar eas, such as the Afri can states, without current charts.
A most sig nifi cant area in volves the ef fect of this indus try on the amount of money that the military and intel li gence com mu ni ties will need for manned and unmanned airborne-reconnaissance systems and satellite-reconnaissance programs. Cur rently, we don't have the model ing systems to accu rately predict the extent to which com mer cial im agery can off set or con trib ute to the satis fac tion of govern ment require ments, but those analyti cal tools are in the works. My sense is that these new commer cial capa bili ties will both comple ment and re duce the numbers of military and intel li gence systems required. The result ing sav ings could be substan tial.
Navigation
The evolu tion of the commer cial aspects of space naviga tion is not as clear as the ar eas previ ously discussed. Although this sys tem was devel oped for military use and ini tial commer cial sales were to small aircraft, pleas ure boats, and large air craft (af ter Fed eral Aviation Admin istra tion approval), the market today and in the future will lie over whelm ingly in the consumer sector. To be sure, this is a growing area for com merce-GPS worldwide sales have grown from about $500 million in 1993 to $4 bil lion in 1998 and are projected to increase to $16 billion by 2003. 2 2 Naviga tion systems for cars are the highest growth area, followed closely by handheld systems now avail able for under $100. The military, of course, has reaped the advan tage of the dra matic drop in receiver costs due to commer cial volume-air craft receiver costs have been re duced an or der of mag ni tude. Moreo ver, GPS re ceiv ers have be come con sid era bly smaller in weight and volume as well as more reli able. 23 Reduc tion in cost and size will cer tainly in crease mili tary ap pli ca tions.
Whereas commer cial firms will develop and oper ate either the spaceborne portion of com mu ni ca tions, launch, and re mote sens ing or the asso ci ated ground infra struc ture, it is un likely that GPS, the US space-navigation sys tem, will evolve similarly-at least in the near fu ture. The rea son, of course, is the presi den tial GPS policy of March 1996, which clearly enunci ated that "GPS has been deThe Air Force has an effort to deal with these three interrelated problems of denying enemy exploitation, maintaining the capability for US military and allied use, and assuring continued civil use.
signed as a dual use system with the primary pur pose of enhanc ing the effec tive ness of US and allied military forces." 24 As such, the policy reaf firmed DOD's respon si bil ity to ac quire, op er ate, and main tain GPS. At the same time, the US govern ment is commit ted to the non mili tary use of GPS on a continu ous, world wide basis, free of direct-user fees. Al though the United States wants to prevent en emy use of GPS during wartime, policy dic tates that the Air Force must op er ate GPS as a "global in for ma tion util ity" with out un duly dis rupt ing or degrad ing civil ian uses of the sys tem. A recent bilat eral coop era tion agree ment with Japan, the world's other leading pro ducer of commer cial GPS equipment, rein forced this commit ment. 25 Al though one could envi sion a GPS an tenna as a payload on a commer cially pro vided common bus, the fact that basic GPS will continue to be a government-provided free good for the next several years makes it dif fi cult to envi sion how a commer cial firm would have any incen tive to compete. I un der stand, however, that a few entre pre neurs are look ing at pro vid ing dif fer en tial GPS serv ices from space-but the market is not devel oped. Clearly, precise spatial refer ence is es sen tial for all forms of robot ics, from play ing fields to laying pipes. Inter na tion ally, I un der stand that the Ger mans at one time were think ing about acquir ing the Russian GLONASS for a regional augmen ta tion sys tem.
De spite the fact that GPS may not fit the other mod els, it has obvi ously become abso lutely criti cal to our armed forces. Virtu ally all platforms (terres trial, air, and seaborne), indi vid ual ground units, and a host of muni tions (mis siles and bombs) ei ther now or in the near fu ture will em ploy GPS for timely and precise naviga tion. With this depend ency has come a real concern about the vulner abil ity of GPS. President Clin ton's policy recog nized this vexing problem and directed DOD to prevent the hostile use of GPS to en sure that the United States main tains a mili tary ad van tage. Thus, GPS has within its design a capa bil ity to degrade the accu racy of the sig nal to one hundred meters-known as se lected availabil ity.
As the commer cial use of the GPS signal even to day dwarfs the mili tary's, with the gap ever widen ing, the selected-availability fea ture-con trolled by the military-has become a paramount issue over the past few years. Con se quently, the pol icy in cludes a pro vi sion that, begin ning in 2000, the president will make an annual de ter mi na tion on the contin ued use of this feature. 2 6 The policy provides for discon tinu ing selected availabil ity within a dec ade (by 2006), but many peo ple in the na tional secu rity commu nity believe that it will be discon tin ued earlier. The Air Force has an ef fort to deal with these three inter re lated prob lems of deny ing enemy exploi ta tion, main tain ing the ca pa bil ity for US mili tary and al lied use, and assur ing contin ued civil use. The Air Force and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) are explor ing many differ ent techni cal approaches, includ ing a higher-power signal on the follow-on GPS Block IIF buy; embed ding an atomic clock in the receiv ers; install ing adaptive nul ling anten nae in the skin of the platform or weapon; or re us ing the GPS spec trum to provide more capa ble, jam-resistant signal struc ture for op era tions in high-threat en vi ron ments.
At the outset of this arti cle, I posed the di lemma that the Air Force, DOD's space ser vice, would have great diffi culty funding the new space require ments inher ent in real iz ing its stra te gic vi sion. The prob lem lies in af ford ing new initia tives while maintain ing basic space services in the face of a flat or declin ing DOD budget. These reduc tions could be due to higher-than-anticipated infla tion or, in the ab sence of a press ing threat, the need for DOD to con trib ute more heav ily to the move to bal ance the budget.
Clearly, we should pur sue a number of new mili tary space initia tives over the next 10-20 years. For exam ple, as more commerce is placed in orbit and as we depend more on space, DOD will need a more compre hen sive pro gram to protect our assets. The previ ously men tioned report by the National Defense Panel, Trans form ing Defense: Na tional Se cu rity in the 21st Century, recom mended increased at ten tion to this area. A compre hen sive pro tec tion program would include improv ing our ability to detect and assess threats (sur veil lance), enhanc ing the surviv abil ity of ground stations and platforms, and using com mer cial assets to augment national secu rity capa bili ties, to name a few. 27 Many people in the Air Force believe that cer tain surveil lance functions now done by air craft systems such as the E-3 Sentry airborne warning and control system and E-8C joint surveil lance, target attack radar system should more appro pri ately be done from space. Both of these systems use very old airframes and are quite ex pen sive to op er ate. For years, we have pursued the holy grail of space-based radar (SBR), only to be thwarted by the power-aperture-product problem. To get the quality required for tracking, the space craft must be at a rela tively low al ti tude, and to get the global cover age, one must orbit a great many spacecraft. This conun drum led to an expen sive program. New technolo gies in miniaturi za tion, power, and antenna design may permit an afford able SBR (the new term is ground moving target indi ca tor [GMTI] ). Moreover, the capa bil ity and effi ciency of an SBR/GMTI would neces si tate an en tirely new concept of opera tions. But there is good news here: to demon strate the poten tial of such a system, DARPA has teamed with
The Air Force has always been bedeviled by concerns over making space a battleground.
the Air Force and NRO on the Dis cov erer II. This tech nol ogy dem on stra tion will fly two proto type spacecraft by 2003, paving the way for the de vel op ment and de ploy ment of a con stel la tion of 24-48 sat el lites by 2010. The pro gram seeks to employ commercial-design practices to pro duce op era tion sat el lites at costs of $100 mil lion per unit.
As for weapons, the Air Force has always been bedev iled by concerns over making space a battle ground. Conse quently, the Air Force-and the Army, for that matter-has had a number of unsuc cess ful anti sat el lite (ASAT) pro grams. I an tici pate two rea sons that would stimu late a wider debate on ASAT. First is the phe nome non that serves as the subject of this ar ti cle-the commer ciali za tion of space. As more capa bil ity moves to space and as we become criti cally de pend ent upon that space in fra struc ture for our day-to-day living (much less our defense), I think the nation will want to pro vide the nec es sary pro tec tion and de ter rence to attack. Here, the naval analogy of free dom of the seas is apt. The sec ond rea son is that the prolif era tion of high-resolution, remote-sensing systems presents oppor tu ni ties for our ad ver sar ies to tar get our forces and fa cili ties from space. I think our command ers in the field would want a system to negate the threat posed by this target ing capa bil ity.
As for perma nently based weapons in space, for the mainstream body politic, this sub ject has always been politi cally incor rect. Frankly, I think that this will gradually change. More and more deci sion makers see the need for a national missile-defense sys tem, and the most effec tive and effi cient way to defend the United States from missile attack would utilize a space-based system. The Air Force is also working with the Ballis tic Mis sile Defense Organi za tion to conduct a treaty-compliant space-based laser demon stra tion by 2008. Despite differ ences of opin ion as to the correct techni cal solu tion, the ma tur ity of the technol ogy, and a plausi ble date for launch, we have discourse. The coun try must in vest in these ena bling tech nolo gies to ensure that we are ready when the need arises and the po liti cal will be comes mani fest.
